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LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MEDIATION
Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley*
Next to the confrontation between two highly trained,finely honed batteries
of lauyers,jungle warfare is a stately minuet.1
Peacemaking problem-solving lawyers are the legal profession'sequivalent of
doctors who practicepreventive medicine. Their efforts are generally over2
shadowed by the heroics of surgeons and litigators.

I.

INTRODUcIMON

The legal profession needs help. The predominant adversary culture of competitiveness 3 and preoccupation with the autonomous self
are all too-familiar descriptions of American lawyering, for which Professor Mary Ann Glendon offers a much needed corrective. Glendon
argues eloquently for more civility in the practice of law,4 more delib* Associate Professor of Law, Fordhamn Law School; Director of Fordham Law
School Mediation Clinic. I would like to thank Mary Daly, Catherine McCauliff,
Russell Pearce, Maria Volpe, and Ian Weinstein for helpful comments and Isatu Kanu
for research assistance.
1 BrLu VEECE, THE HUsTLER's HANDBOOK 335 (1965).
2 MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAwYERs: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SociETY 107 (1994).

3 See, e.g., Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: PittingAggressive Tactics Against
Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 637 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin,
Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lauyers in Litigation, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 509, 511 n.9 (1994).
4 GLENDON, supra note 2. Glendon joins other critics in her concern for the
disoriented condition of the legal profession. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN, THE
LOST LAWYER: FAiLING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993); SOL M. LNowrrz, THE
BETRAYED: PROFESSION LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWErImTH CENTURY (1994).

The sorry state of affairs has led some states to develop civility standards to guide
attorney's professional behavior. See New York State Standards of Civility, discussed in
N.Y. STATE BAR NEWs, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 1, 3 (standards on file with the author). But
see Russell G. Pearce, The ProfessionalismParadigmShift: Why DiscardingProfessionalIdeology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229 (1995)
(arguing that a business paradigm is more likely to improve the conduct and reputation of the bar).
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eration between lawyers and clients,5 and a more relational understanding of autonomy. 6 She appeals to lawyers' creative capacity to
develop more fully as peacemakers 7 rather than as "connoisseurs of
conflict."8

In this essay, I locate Glendon's appeal in the mediation process
and explore how her principles of civility and vision of deliberation
can help in developing a theory of representational mediation practice. 9 How can lawyers respect the dignitary and participatory values
of mediation and at the same time protect client interests? What are
the values which differentiate mediation from the "hired gun" mentality of adversarial practice? This essay explores these questions in the
client counseling context and suggests an approach to mediation client counseling which is based on a deliberative process. The deliberative process model calls for greater attention to the principle of
informed consent in mediation.1 0
II.

MEDIATION'S POTENTIAL FOR PEACEMAKING

A.

Rights Rhetoric and the Adversarial Culture

There is an immediate connection between what Glendon has
observed as America's rights obsession and the legal profession's excessive adversarial behavior. In much the same way that exaggerated
rights rhetoric impedes public deliberation,1 lack of civility in lawyering can interfere with private deliberations between lawyers and clients. The push to absolutes in both extremes fails to respect the
dignity of the human element, an overriding force which drives Glen12
don's social and professional values.
Mediation offers enormous potential for lawyers to recognize and
honor the missing human dignity dimension in current versions of
5

See

6

See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TAUC THE IMPOVERSHMENT OF POLrnCAL Dis-

GLENDON,

supra note 2, at 35-36.

cOURSE 109-44 (1991).
7 See GLENDON, supra note 2, at 101, 247.
8

See id. at 40-59.

9

The role of the lawyer who represents a party in connection with the mediation

process is conceptually and professionally distinguishable from that of the lawyer who

mediates a dispute between two parties. See infra text accompanying notes 47-59.
10 This is part of my larger project which examines the nature of informed consent in mediation.
11 Glendon claims that rights rhetoric fails to recognize the "social dimensions of
human personhood." GLENDON, supra note 6, at 109.
12 See, e.g., id. at 179.
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adversarial lawyering. 13 It is a process governed by mutual respect,
not by the rugged individualism or rudeness which too often charac14
terizes adversarial law practice.
Mediation is best understood as an extension of the negotiation
process. It is an informal process based on principles of individual
sovereignty and self-determination.' 5 In the context of mediation
practice, this means that the parties affected by a dispute decide the
outcome of the dispute.' 6 The language of mediation can be a powerful antidote to what Glendon labels the "exaggerated absoluteness of
our American rights rhetoric,"' 7 for human relationships matter more
in mediation than do absolute legal rights.' 8 The discourse on mediation practice presents mediation as offering a new vision for lawyers 19
largely because it pays more attention to the dignity of human persons
20
than to the abstractness of legal rules.
The civility principles Glendon extols are important for one set of
goals which has inspired mediation practice-dissatisfaction with the

13 See generally Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29
(1982); Jacqueline Nolan-Haley & Maria R. Volpe, Teaching Mediation as a Layering
Role,39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 571, 579-80 (1989).
14 See, e.g., Raoul Lionel Felder, I'm Paid to Be Rude, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1997, at
A23.
15 See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard I (American Arbitration Ass'n, American Bar Ass'n, and Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution
1994) [hereinafter MODEL STANDARDS]. See alsoJohnD. Feerick, Toward Uniform Standards of Conductfor Mediators, 38 S.TEx. L. REv. 455 (1997).
16 In the words of the late law Professor Lon Fuller: "[M]ediation is commonly
directed, not toward achieving conformity to norms, but toward the creation of the
relevant norms themselves." Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-ItsForms and Functions,44 S.
CAL. L. REv. 305, 308 (1971).
17 GLENDON, supra note 6, at 45.
18 Professor Fuller's classic definition of the mediation process captures these essential characteristics. Mediation, he observes, has the "capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to
achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another." Fuller, supra note 16, at
325.
19 See Riskin, supra note 13, at 57.
20 Long before the current popular appeal of mediation, John Noonan reminded
us of the extent to which law has ignored persons in favor of rules. JOHN T. NooNAN,
JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 9-14 (1976). Scholars continue to be concerned
with the extent to which law and legal education undervalue the human element. See,
e.g., Julius G. Getman, Human Voice in Legal Discourse, 66 TEx. L. REV. 577 (1988);
PATRtCIAJ. WituIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
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cut-throat tactics of the adversarial culture. 21 Cooperation, courtesy,
decency, dignity, mutual respect, and reasoned discourse-the principles which permeate Glendon's appeal to lawyers-hark back to timeless values that are important for public behavior. They embody the
best values of the common law tradition 22 and, in my view, are precisely the principles which will make all the difference in representa23
tional mediation practice.
B.

The Problem

The growth of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement, 24 and mediation in particular, is slowly transforming the practice of law, but little attention has been paid to the normative
questions of how that transformation should take place, how lawyers
should behave, and what rules should govern their behavior. Much
needs to be done if representational mediation practice is to be distin25
guishable from adversarial-style lawyering.
Lawyers are the dominant players in the adversary system. Scholars have characterized the "standard conception" of their role as one
26
which honors the principles of partisanship and nonaccountability.
Translated into practice, this has meant zealous advocacy for clients
27
with little moral responsibility for helping clients achieve their goals.
21 For a discussion of additional goals which have inspired the development of
mediation and other ADR processes, see STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DisPuTE REsoLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION AND OTHER PROCESSES 6-9 (2d ed. 1992).
22

See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW (1969).

I

thank Catherine McCauliff, my first teacher of English legal history, for reminding me
of this connection.
23 For a discussion of the influence of these values in the early development of
legal ethics in the adversary system, see Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican
Origins of the Legal Ethics Code, 6 GEoJ. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992); THOMAS L. SHArMER
& ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 32-39
(1994) (discussing the gentleman-lawyer tradition).
24 ADR has developed over the past twenty-two years. Mediation was promoted as
a nonjudicial method of dispute resolution at the Pound Conference in 1976. See
Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE
CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE 65 (1979).

25 One writer has described a new "dispute resolution environment as a 'liti-mediation' culture, in which it becomes taken for granted that mediation is the normal
way to end litigation." John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Trans-

form Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 841 (1997). See generally Carrie MenkelMeadow, Ethics in Alternative DisputeResolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary
Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997).
26

See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY XX (1988).

27

See id.
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Existing models for lawyers who assist clients in mediation are based
largely on the dominant ethic, and this raises a question of fit. Is the
traditional zealous advocate, sometimes "hired gun," model of the adversarial system consistent with the primary participatory and dignitary values of mediation? Should lawyering in mediation replicate the
adversarial model? I think not. Mediation practice should be
grounded in deliberative and problem-solving processes.2 8 Unfortunately, lawyer-controlled mediations often look like muscled settlement conferences, and negotiation in mediation looks like aggressive
trial advocacy. Meanwhile, clients are kept in the dark.29 Why are so
many lawyers missing the point?
Part of the problem may be lawyers' kneejerk reactions to
Rambo-style mediators, 30 but at a deeper level, the problem is a conceptual one. Many lawyers simply lack a basic understanding of the
mediation process, the premises and values which drive it, and the
creative outcomes which are possible. 3 1 As a result, in experimenting
with representational mediation practice, too many lawyers are pouring new wine into old wineskins. This explains why the human dignity, mutuality of respect, and responsible client decisionmaking that
have been absent from much of traditional adversarial practice are
often missing in current versions of representational mediation
32
practice.
In reflecting on how Glendon's principles can help in developing
a theory of representational mediation practice, I will focus primarily
on client counseling activity, that complicated set of interactions between lawyers and clients which defines their professional relationship. 33 In my view, to the extent that mediation client counseling is
firmly grounded in a deliberative and problem-solving process, mediated negotiations will be responsive to clients' real needs and interests. Then we may just begin to see a law practice in which the human
element really does matter.
28 See GLENDON, supra note 2, at 102-08.
29 See infra text accompanying note 83.
30 See, e.g., Lande, supra note 25, at 850; James J. Alfini, Trashing Bashing and
HashingIt Out: Is This the End of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 47 (1991).
31 This theme was echoed at the International Conference of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) held in September 1997 in Orlando, Florida. One workshop, "Bringing Out the Best in Lawyers," explored the destructive
effect that lawyers can have on a mediation session (audiotape on file with the
author).
32 See infra text accompanying notes 80-86.
33 See David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practiceof Law, 41 VAND.
L. REv. 717, 737-40 (1988).
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UNDERSTANDING MEDIATION AS THE CLIENT'S PROCESS

A.

Defining Mediation

A conceptual understanding of the mediation process is essential
in developing a theory of representational mediation practice. Sev34
eral competing definitions of mediation make this a difficult task.
At its most basic level, mediation is an extension of the negotiation
process. 35 A third-party, the mediator, assists disputing parties in
resolving their disputes. A number of mediation models 3 6 are identified in the literature, and there is much debate about the extent to
which mediator assistance is appropriate.3 7 Depending upon the philosophical orientation of the practitioner, mediation may be viewed
instrumentally as an efficient settlement process,3 8 or in broader
40
terms as a healing3 9 or transformative process.
B.

Listening to Clients

The controlling principle of mediation is self-determination.
This means that the parties involved in a dispute participate in its reso34 One of the current textbooks used in some law school mediation courses describes ten definitions of the mediation process. See KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE

16-17 (1994).

35 To the extent that the mediation process focuses on parties' real needs and
interests rather than on the positions they assert, it is a process based on problemsolving negotiation. See ROGER

FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING

(Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991); Carrie MenkelMeadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31
AGREEMENT WITHOUT

GIVING IN

UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
36 See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH

BUSH &JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLIGT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994);
DEBORAH

M.

KOLB ET AL., WHEN

TALK WORKS:

PROFILES OF MEDIATORS

(1994); Ken-

neth Kressel et al., The Settlement-Orientation vs. The Problem-SolvingStyle in Custody Mediation, 50 J. Soc. ISSUES 67 (1994); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators'
Orientations,Strategies, and Techniques: A Gridfor the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NECOT. L. REV. 7
(1996); Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple
Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1997).
37 See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Evaluative Versus FacilitativeMediation: A Discussion, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 919 (1997); Riskin, supra note 36.

38 E.g., Alfini, supra note 30, at 47. It should be noted that mediation can be a
voluntary or mandatory undertaking. While the essence of the actual mediation process is voluntary, increasingly, mediation is becoming a procedural requirement for
trial or administrative relief.
39 See Leonard L. Riskin, Toward New Standardsfor the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation,
26 ARz. L. REV. 329 (1984); Special Issue, Beyond Technique: The Soul of Family Mediation, 11 MEDIATION Q. 1 (1993).
40 E.g., BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 36.
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lution and are able "to reach a voluntary, uncoerced agreement.

'41

42
Thus, mediation is frequently exalted for its empowerment aspects.

What does this mean for representational mediation practice? For
lawyers, this translates into a relinquishment of their central role in
presenting a client's case. 43 Clients tell their own stories in mediation
to the mediator, their lawyers, and their opponents. These are stories
which might not be heard in the official legal system constrained by
rules of evidence and procedure. Feelings and emotions are valued.
Dignity is attached to stories simply because they come from people
who lived those stories.
Client storytelling is an integral part of the mediation process. It
captures the human element which is so often missing when lawyers
do most of the talking and translate client stories into legal contexts. 44
Lawyers and clients who listen to each other have greater understanding and appreciation of the other person's real interests. In listening
to clients tell their stories in mediation, lawyers can develop greater
empathy and compassion, virtues which help them become more
skilled at problem-solving with their clients instead of for their clients. 4 5 Finally, the emphasis on client narrative supports the kind of
deliberative process that Glendon advocates for lawyers and clientsexploring all angles of a problem in a give-and-take based on mutual
46
respect for the dignity of the other person.
In the following section, I sketch the varied roles of lawyers in
representational mediation practice and consider how current lawyerclient decisionmaking models often fail to support the dignitary and
participatory values of mediation.
IV.

LAWYERING IN MEDIATION

The most familiar role of lawyers in the mediation process has
been their activity as neutrals trying to facilitate the resolution of disputes between parties. However, lawyers also represent parties in mediation. The scope of representational lawyering in mediation
41
42

MODEL STANDARDS, Standard I, Comment.

E.g., BUSH & FOLGER, supranote 36.

43 Some clients may prefer to have their lawyers speak for them in mediation. See
infra text accompanying notes 53-57.
44 Professor Robert Dinnerstein reminds us of the importance in the clinical
movement of clients being able to tell their stories in the advocacy and litigation setting. See Robert D. Dinnerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. Rxv. 697,
723-25 (1992) (book review).
45 This should also be true in traditional adversarial law practice when lawyers
listen to their clients.
46

See GLENDON, supra note 2, at 35-36.
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encompasses the functions which lawyers perform generally for cli47
ents: counseling, negotiation, evaluation, and advocacy.
A.

Counseling

The lawyers' counseling function is dominant in representational
mediation practice. The fundamental question, whether dispute settlement by mediation best meets the clients' needs,4 8 requires consideration of both structural and emotional factors within the context of
each client's situation. 4 9 If a client decides to enter into a mediation
process, counseling includes numerous planning and participation
decisions.5 0 In the growing number ofjurisdictions where clients are
required to participate in mediation, 5 ' counseling also would include
52
decisions about the nature of this participation.
B.

Negotiation

53
Even though parties are encouraged to speak for themselves,
lawyers may negotiate for their clients in mediation; much of the liter-

47 See Preamble to the MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr, § 2, A Lawyer's
Responsibilities, in 1996 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, eds., 1996).
48 There is little empirical data comparing mediation to other forms of dispute
resolution. See Jeanne M. Brett et al., The Effectiveness of Mediation: An Independent
Analysis of Cases Handled by FourMajor Service Providers,12 NEGOT. J. 259 (1996). For a
prediction of a rule that would require lawyers to allow clients to pursue mediation,
see Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representationand the Next Steps Toward Client Control:
Attorney Malpracticefor the Failureto Allow the Client to Control Negotiation andPursueAlternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819, 825-839 (1990).
49 See, e.g., DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DIsPUTEs: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES
FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS 125-26 (1996); Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We
Need Mediation For?". Mediation's "Value-Added"for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 1 (1996); Robert H. Mnoonkin, Why NegotiationsFail: An Explorationof Barriers
to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 235 (1993).
50 See infra text accompanying notes 128-31.
51 See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE
§§ 7:01-07 (2d ed. 1994).
52 See Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended, or
Required?, 38 S.TEx. L. REV. 575 (1997); Edward F. Sherman, Court-MandatedAlternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of ParticipationShould be Required?, 46 SMU L. REv.
2079 (1993); Richard D. English, Annotation, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Sanctions
for Failureto Participatein Good Faith in, or Comply with Agreement Made in, Mediation, 43
A.L.R. 5th 545 (1996).
53 See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.

1998]

LAWYERS,

CLIENTS,

AND

MEDIATION

1377

ature on lawyering in mediation focuses on this role. 54 Some pro-

grams exclude attorneys from participating in mediation, 55 but with
the growth of mandatory mediation it is not surprising that lawyers are
participating in mediation to a greater degree. 56 Clients may not relish the prospect of a face-off with opposing counsel, particularly in
57
light of the reported behavior of some attorneys in mediation.
C. Evaluation
Lawyers may review agreements made in mediation before clients
make a final commitment to the agreement. This "independent
counsel" role of the lawyer was first recognized by the American Bar
Association in 1984 with adoption of the standards of practice for family mediators58 and is continued today in many ethical codes and
court rules. 59 Evaluation is a critical lawyering function, particularly
where parties have not been represented by counsel during the mediation process.
D. Lawyer-Client Interactions in Mediation
1. Weakness of Current Decisionmaking Models
Lawyers' professional conduct is governed by the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, neither of which specifically addresses the role of the represen60
tational lawyer in mediation.
54

Some authors refer to this as the lawyer's advocacy role in mediation. See, e.g.,

JOHN W. COOLEY, MEDIATION ADvocAcY (1996);,Michael Lewis, Advocacy in Mediation:

One Mediator's View, DIsp. REsOL. MAG., Fall 1995, at 7.
55 This exclusion has been the subject of considerable criticism. See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power,40 BuFF. L.
Rxv. 441 (1992); Trina Grillo, The MediationAlternative: ProcessDangersfor Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).

56 Critics of divorce mediation in particular have urged more attorney participation and the current trend is toward attorney involvement. See Craig A. McEwen et al.,
Bring in the Lawyers: Challengingthe DominantApproaches to EnsuringFairness in Divorce
Mediation, 79 MINN. L. Rxv. 1317 (1995).
57 See, e.g., McKinley v. McKinley, 648 So. 2d 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (claiming that attorney badgered and intimidated a party during a mediation).
58 See ABA STANDArDS OF PRACTrICE FOR LAWyE MEDIATORS IN FAMILY DISPUTS,
adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, August 1984,
reprinted in GOLDBERG Ex AL., supra note 21, at 469.
59 The codes generally provide that parties be allowed to consult with their attorney before signing a mediation agreement. E.g., id.; FLtA. F~mu.LAW RULEs PROC.
§ 12.740(0(1) (1997).
60 The Rules are equally silent on the role of the lawyer-mediator. The Model
Rules refer to an intermediary function which has been equated with common repre-
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The Model Rules offer, at best, only theoretical guidance. Rule
1.2(a) provides that a lawyer must abide by a client's decision about
whether or not to settle. 61 In practice, this rule has translated into a
model of decisionmaking which has given attorneys enormous conthe
trol. Following the ends/means approach, the client decides '62
"ends" of a given problem and the attorney decides the "means.
Little attention was paid to the concept of client decisionmaking
until the late 1970s, when scholars began to suggest the relevance of
the informed consent doctrine in legal practice. 63 The traditional allocation of authority was criticized by numerous scholars who argued
64
for greater client involvement and more sensitivity to client needs.
A rich counseling literature focusing on "client-centeredness" developed, in which arguments were advanced against paternalistic lawyering in favor of greater client participation. 65 In lawyering for elite
clients, however, discussion focused not on how to empower clients
but on how to remain moral when already empowered clients used
66
lawyers as hired guns.
Client-centeredness has remained the leading model of counseling, although there is considerable theoretical debate about its meansentation.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 2.2 (1995) [hereinafter

MODEL RULES].

61 Id. Rule 1.2(a).
62 Id. Rule 1.2; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7
(1980). See generally CHARLES W. WoLFRA, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 4.3, at 156-57
(1986).
63 Roger W. Andersen, Informed Decisionmaking in an Office Practice,28 B.C. L. REV.
225 (1987); Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practiceof Law, 48 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 307 (1980);Judith L. Maute, Allocation of DecisionmakingAuthority Underthe Model
Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1049 (1984); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 41 (1979); Mark Spiegel, The New Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct: Lawyer-Client
DecisionMaking and the Role ofRules in Structuringthe Lawyer-ClientDialogue, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 1003; Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attornea-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1987).
64 E.g., GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAIVYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR
CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 124-272 (1978); DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C.
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH 185-86
(1977); DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH (1991).

65 See, e.g., Dinnerstein, supranote 44 and sources cited therein. More recently,
some scholars have rejected the paternalism/participation dichotomy and argued instead for lawyer-client relationships based on other values. E.g., SHAFFER & COCHRAN,
supranote 23, at 40-49 (friendship); PaulJ. Zwier & Ann B. Hamric, The Ethics of Care
andReimagining the Lawyer/ClientRelationship,22J. CONTEMP. L. 383, n.5 (1996) (ethics
of care).
66 Glendon's critique of lawyering focuses on large firm practice.
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ing. The divide has fallen essentially along two lines: between those
who favor greater client autonomy67 and those who argue for some
species of paternalism. 68 The views of practicing lawyers, however,
more tempered by the realities of practice, show that decisions about
the allocation of decisionmaking authority in the lawyer-client relationship are far more contextual than the theoretical debate would
69
suggest.
Current attorney-client decisionmaking models fail to reflect the
reality of mediation-a highly contextualized process built on the process of self-determination. The critical decisionmaking questions in
representational mediation practice are concerned not with the extent to which clients should be allowed to participate, but rather with
the manner in which lawyers should be involved.7 0 How can lawyers as
"wise counselors"7' help clients exercise their self-determination? Put
more simply, how can lawyers help clients benefit from the mediation
process?
2.

Some Problems with Mediated Negotiations

Traditional lawyering in negotiation undervalued client presence
and participation; lawyers simply did not bring clients to the bargaining table.7 2 Thus, the literature on legal negotiation focused largely
on lawyer-to-lawyer dynamics.7 3 Given the traditional emphasis on
67 E.g., Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987).
68 See, e.g., David Luban, Paternalismand the Legal Profession,1981 Wis. L. REv. 454.
Beyond the theoretical debate about paternalism, the problem of lawyer manipulation of clients still remains. See Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1306
n.361 (1994).
69 See, e.g., Ann Southworth, Lawyer-ClientDecisionmakingin Civil Rights andPoverty
Practice:An Empirical Study of Lawyers' Norms, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1101, 1106 n.14
(1996).
70 For a description of the types of decisions which lawyers and clients must consider, see infra text accompanying notes 127-31.
71 Glendon describes those ideals in part as the belief "that lawyers can often
serve their clients best by discouraging litigation, or by deliberating with them about a
proposed course of action, rather than by unquestioningly carrying out the client's
desires." GLENDON, supra note 2, at 35-36.
72 I refer here primarily to dispute negotiations. See generally Leonard L. Riskin,
The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference: The Lessons ofG. Heileman Brewing Co.
v.Joseph Oat Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059 (1991).
73 See, e.g., Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a HealingProcess, 1996J. DIsP. REsOL.
1, 24. More recent negotiation scholarship on lawyering has focused both on the
dynamics of the lawyer as negotiating agent for the client and on negotiating the
termsof the attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., William L.F. Feistiner & Austin
Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lauyer-Client Interac-
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lawyers' performance in negotiation, it is not surprising that many of
the existing models of mediated negotiations focus on the lawyer
rather than on the client as the primary participant.7 4 Even though
mediation is an extension of problem-solving negotiation and should
give disputants control, many lawyers persist in following adversarial
negotiation styles and still control the settlement process. 75 In some
cases, lawyer-controlled mediation simply replicates a variation of
traditional settlement conferences where lawyers dominate and cli76
ents' real interests may not be satisfied.
The literature offers conflicting advice. Some commentators crit77
icize lawyers for abandoning their advocacy role in mediation.
78
Others argue that lawyer advocacy is inconsistent with mediation.
Thus, it is not surprising that many lawyers do not know how to represent clients in mediation.7 9 The less than ideal representative lawyers
may act like combatants 80 or, just as some lawyers do in adversarial
tions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (1992); Alex J. Hurder, Negotiating the Lawyer-Client
Relationship: A Search for Equality and Collaboration,44 BuFF. L. REV. 71 (1996)
74 SeeJohn B. Bates, Jr., Using Mediation To Win For Your Client, PRAc. LAW., Mar.
1992, at 23; Stephen Patrick Doyle, Trial Lawyers Should Add Skilled Participationin
Mediation to Services They Provideto Clients, BNAADR Rep., Sept. 27, 1990, at 325;James
D. Knotter, Settling the Entrenched Case Through the Mediation Process, 49 Disp. RESOL. J.
23 (1994); Chris Martin, RepresentingA Client in Mediation, COMPLEAT LAW., Fall 1996,
at 34.
75 E.g., Milton Heumann &Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation
Settlement Methods in New Jersey: "You Can't Always Get What You Want", 12 OHIo ST. J.
Disp. RESOL. 253 (1997).

76 See, e.g., Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Northwest v. Jane Doe, 903 P.2d 375
(Or. Ct. App. 1995). However, there are some hopeful reports of lawyers' behavior in
mediation. See, e.g., McEwen, supra note 56; Riskin, supra note 72, at 1061.
77 See, e.g., Penelope Eileen Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The Lawyer's Role in
Divorce Mediation, 28 Fum. L.Q. 177 (1994).
78 See, e.g., Mark C. Rutherford, Lawyers andDivorce Mediation:Designing the Role of
"Outside Counsel" MEDIATION Q., June 1986, at 17, 26-27.
79 This situation should change as scholars and practitioners begin to focus on
representational mediation practice. See, e.g., EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTIVE 245-53 (1997); CooLEY, supra note 54; EmC GALTON, REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN MEDIATION 75-80 (1994);
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 445-49; JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF
DIsPURE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS (2d ed. 1996); LEONARD L. RISKIN &
JAMES E. WESTEROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 436-442 (2d ed. 1997); RocERS & MCEWEN, supra note 51, at § 4:11; David Plimpton, Mediation of Disputes: The Role
of the Lawyer and How Best to Serve the Client's Interest, 8 ME. B.J. 38, 45 (1993); see also
supra note 49.
80 See, e.g., Charles Guittard, Preparingfor Mediation and Negotiation, PRAc. LAW.,
Oct. 1991, at 65 ("Your client needs you to participate in mediation because he wants
your advice as if it were an invisible suit of armor."). However, some critics may prefer
to have a lawyer be a combatant; see, e.g., Bryan, supra note 77.
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practice, they may fail either to understand or to present their clients'
82
underlying needs and interests, 81 try to take control of the process,
fail to inform clients about what is happening in mediation, 83 or coerce clients into settling.84 Worse still are some of the reported ethical violations: deliberately misrepresenting facts 85 or violating the
86
confidentiality of a mediation session.
The failure of many lawyers to understand the conceptual differences between adversarial lawyering and mediation practice strongly
suggests the need to develop a theory of "good" representational mediation practice. But there are competing interests. On the one
hand, we must safeguard client voice and encourage client participation. At the same time, however, the demands of professionalism require that lawyers guide clients towards responsible decisionmaking.
In my view, the activity of client counseling plays a critical role in managing these tensions. In the following section I explore ways in which
mediation client counseling can manage the tensions between client
participation and attorney control. Specifically, I consider how Glendon's view of deliberation and her civility principles can inform a
"good" theory of mediation client counseling.
V.

MEDIATION CLIENT COUNSELING: THINKING ABOUT A

DELBERATIvE PRocEss

Too often, lawyer-controlled mediation is not preceded by any
meaningful deliberation with clients. Lawyers do not listen to their
clients but presume to know their goals and then dictate what should
occur in mediation. Sadly, this behavior can sabotage the mediation
process.
Deliberation is a necessary pre-condition to client decisionmaking, both in the mediation counseling relationship and in the mediation process. 8 7 Prudential discussions between lawyer and client
81 E.g., Heumann & Hyman, supra note 75.
82 E.g., id.
83 See Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Northwest v. Jane Doe, 903 P.2d 375 (Or.
App. 1995) (alleging failure to inform client of arbitration provision in mediation settlement agreement).
84 E.g., McEnany v. West Del. County Community Sch. Dist., 844 F. Supp. 523
(N.D. Iowa 1994) (finding that even if an attorney threatened to withdraw if the party
did not settle as the party claimed, it occured after the mediation).
85 See In re Waller, 573 A.2d 780 (D.C. App. Ct. 1990).
86 Bernard v. Galen Group, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
87 Commentators have called for deliberation in various aspects of the attorneyclient relationship. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 4; Anthony V. Alfieri, DefendingRadal Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995); Colin Croft, Reconceptualizing American
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about the relative merits of particular courses of action help to
achieve participatory and educated client decisionmaking, the
hallmarks of the informed consent doctrine. Deliberation honors the
reasoning power of clients and lawyers. In the give and take of argument and debate, lawyers and clients gain a better understanding of
each other's views. In short, the methodology of deliberation brings
lawyers and clients together and thus fosters mutual respect and
trust.8 s

A.

Glendon's Vision of Deliberation

In its broadest sense, deliberation is understood as a process of
careful calculation and reasoned dialogue.8 9 It is a method of discourse in which individuals debate the merits of particular activities. 90
Deliberation is reflective activity, requiring active participant
engagement.
Glendon's view of deliberation is grounded in her respect for the
intrinsic value of every human being. If the deliberative process is to
Legal Professionalism:A Proposalfor DeliberativeMoral Community, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1256
(1992); Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S.CAL. L. REV. 885 (1996); Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to Lawyers?,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1759 (1993); Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?".AttorneyClient Deliberation RegardingNonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C.L. REV.
213 (1990); Tanina Rostain, The Company We Keep: Kronman'sThe Lost Lawyer and the
Development of Moral Imagination in the Practice of Law, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1017
(1996) (book review).
88 This should have a carryover effect into mediation so that parties are better
able to experience what Lon Fuller has referred to as the central quality of mediation-its "capacity to reorient the parties toward each other." Fuller, supranote 16, at
325.
89 See RANDOM HOUSE DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 527 (2d ed. 1987);
OxFoRD ENCYCLOPEDIC ENGLISH DICrIONARY 381 (1991). See also James E. Fleming,
SecuringDeliberativeAutonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 32 n.176 (1995). Deliberation does
not occur in every situation but only in those cases where there may be doubt or
differences of opinion. Aristotle identifies spelling as an example of activity about
which people do not deliberate. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book III,
85 (J.A.Kt Thomson trans., Penguin Books 1971).
90 In the political sphere, deliberation is endorsed by civic republicans as an optimal decisionmaking process. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ.
1493 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). Calls also resound for greater involvement in deliberative decisionmaking in a wide variety of settings including the courts and the government. See,
e.g, Amy GUTMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 50-52 (1987); Amy GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 229 (1996); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative
Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355 (1991). But see Frederick Schauer,
Discourse and Its Discontents, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309 (1997).
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go beyond what she describes as the "mere clash of unyielding interests, and to end in seemingly irreconcilable conflicts," then it must
rest on some basic social assumptions:
the belief that each and every human being possesses great and inherent value, the willingness to respect the rights of others even at
the cost of some disadvantage to one's self, the ability to defer some
immediate benefits for the sake of long-range goals, and a regard
91
for reason-giving and civility in public discourse.
Glendon's civility principles are assimilated in her understanding of
deliberation. Together they provide an account of deliberation which
focuses on humanity and accountability. Elite clients would be required to listen to their lawyers and not assume that the ethic of client
loyalty buys them hired guns. Poor or otherwise unempowered clients
would expect that their lawyers would listen to them and not perpetuate paternalistic behavior. In short, Glendon's view of the deliberative
process implies reciprocal rights and responsibilities for lawyers and
clients, a concept which is noticeably absent from the prevailing law92
yer or client autonomy models of decisionmaking.
B.

Deliberationin the Mediation CounselingRelationship

What Glendon has observed in the political sphere, that the deliberative process "requires time, information, and forums where facts,
interests, and ideas can be exchanged and debated, '93 is equally true
in the lawyering process. Deliberation in mediation client counseling
does not just happen; there are a series of "first information events"
which precede it: lawyers' understanding of their clients' perspective
and goals and clients' understanding of what will occur in counseling
as well as a general understanding of relevant law. In short, mediation
client counseling based on deliberation calls for greater attention to
the principle of informed consent.
1. Preconditions for Deliberation
First, lawyers must understand their clients' perspective-the
facts as well as the clients' emotional state. 94 While this ability has
been recognized in the litigation context as possibly "an ethically required practice skill," 9 5 it may be more important in the mediation
91 GLENDON, supra note 6, at 179.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 61-69.
93 GLENDON, supra note 6, at 179.
94 See BrIDER & PRICE, supra note 64, at 52-68.
95 Joan L. O'Sullivan et al., EthicalDecisionmakingand Ethics Instruction in Clinical
Law Practice,3 CLINICAL L. REv. 109, 133 (1996).
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process where clients often participate without lawyers. The content
of attorney-client deliberation takes into account the totality of the
clients' circumstances and may include the economic, social, psycho96
logical, moral, political, and religious consequences of actions.
Second, lawyers must attempt to understand 9 7 and not presume
to know their clients' initial goals.9 8 Even though client goals may
change during deliberation, 99 lawyers must be respectful of client
00
preferences from the beginning of the counseling relationship.1
Third, lawyers must ensure that clients have a general understanding of what will occur in the counseling interaction. Clients
must be informed that deliberative counseling has as its goal informed
decisionmaking, both in the attorney-client relationship and in the
mediation process, and be advised of the roles that both attorney and
client will play in it.101 Clients must also be educated about the mediation process and understand its essential differences from litigation.
Unlike adjudication, where disputes are resolved by strangers or are
"settled" by lawyers and judges in the absence of clients, the mediation
10 2
process allows clients to participate actively in resolving disputes.
In adjudication, legal principles serve an important function in settling a dispute between two parties authoritatively.10 3 In mediation,
however, the parties involved in the dispute decide the outcome,
96 The inclusion of non-legal interests in client counseling has also been advocated by other commentators. See, e.g., BINDER & PRICE, supra note 64, at 8-9. Professor Peter Margulies has proposed a specific rule of professional responsibility that
would require lawyers to deliberate with their clients regarding both the interests of
third-party non-clients and the moral, policy, and psychological consequences of legal
action. See Margulies, supra note 87.
97 This is equally true in the litigation context. See O'Sullivan et al., supra note
95, at 139.
98 See Stephen L. Pepper, Counselingat the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in theJurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1600 (1995).
99 See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 64, at 272 n.36.
100 While this point should be self-evident and is frequently true with respect to
elite clients, it has not been the case with poor clients. See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator,Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal
Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992).
101 This is not necessarily happening right now. See, e.g., Roy M. Sobelson, Lawyers, Clients and Assurances of Confidentiality: Lawyers Talking Without Speaking, Clients
Hearing Without Listening 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 703, 704 (1988).
102 The traditional conception of lawyer professionalism did not include any significant client participation or control over the outcome of disputes. See William
Rich, The Role of Lawyers: Beyond Advocacy, 1980 BYU L. REV. 767, 783.
103 See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial ConstitutionalInterpretation, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1359, 1371 (1997).
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which can be based not only on legal, but on nonlegal, principles and
values.
Finally, clients must have a general knowledge about the relevant
law governing their case, so that during deliberation they may meaningfully evaluate alternative courses of actions. 10 4 Clients' knowledge
of their legal rights honors the principle of informed consent. This is
particularly important in jurisdictional settings where mediation is
mandatory. Clients who know their legal rights are able to give informed consent, not only to their full participation in mediation, but
also to any agreement reached in mediation.
2.

The Foundation of Trust

Trust, an essential part of all human relationships, 0 5 provides the
foundational structure for the mediation counseling relationship.
This conception of lawyering is not peculiar to mediation practice;
rather, it builds on the work of those who have advocated more trust
06
and cooperation in the practice of law.'
There is a natural sequence to the development of trust relationships in mediation practice. Clients must be able to trust lawyers to
guide them through decisionmaking; clients qua disputants must be
10 7
able to trust the mediator to guide them in decisionmaking.
Client trust must be acquired. Despite the self-evident necessity
of trust, lawyers should not assume that it is a given in the mediation
counseling relationship. In view of the negative public persona of the
legal profession, lawyers must consciously seek to earn what Anthony
Giddens has called "active trust":
Active trust is trust which has to be won, rather than coming from
the tenure of pre-established social positions or gender roles. Active trust presumes autonomy rather than standing counter to it,
and is a powerful source of social solidarity, since compliance is
freely given rather than enforced by traditional constraints.1 08
104 Cf Pepper, supra note 98, at 1546-47. Certainly all clients should have this
knowledge. However, mediation clients in particular require knowledge of the law
because they may play a more active role speaking for themselves in the mediation

process.
105

See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Trust and Distrust in Professional Ethics, in ETHICS,

TRUST, AND THE PROFESSIONS

69-85 (1991).

106
107

See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 3, at 564; Williams, supra note 73.
See JAY FOLBERG & AJSON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSrVE GUIDE TO
RESOLVING CoNFuars WrrHour LmGATION 38 (1984).
108 ANTHONY GIDDENS, BEYOND L=_r AND RIGHT 14 (1994). Sissela Bok develops

Giddens' thinking in bioethics, arguing that professionals must "win back the active
trust that they no longer can count on receiving automatically." Sissela Bok, Shading
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Active trust implies a mutuality of obligation. Lawyers and clients
trust each other. 10 9 Active trust reinforces client respect. Mutual trust
reinforces the relational nature of client autonomy. Together they
help to build a counseling model based on mediation rather than litigation principles.
Ethical considerations require that lawyers be sensitive to the potential for abuse of trust.11 0 All clients are to some degree vulnerable
and they must trust that their vulnerability will not be exploited."' 1 If
a client is scarred in the mediation counseling relationship, it will be
difficult if not unlikely that a trust relationship can be established in
1 12
mediation. Trust is hard to regain once it is lost.

3.

Integration of Legal and Non-Legal Interests

An explicit goal of deliberative mediation counseling is to structure a decisionmaking process, which like the mediation process, is
responsive to clients' needs and respectful of individual values. This
requires purposeful integration of legal with non-legal interests. 13
The information the lawyer initially acquires is continually integrated
with new data about the clients' real interests in order to achieve a
contextualized understanding for decisionmaking.1 14
Lawyers are not generally accustomed to helping clients understand the connections between their non-legal and legal interests.1 15
In integrating clients' legal and non-legal interests, lawyers must also
learn to be sensitive to their clients' emotions1 16 and be able to intethe Truth in Seeking Informed Consentfor Research Purposes,5
11-12 (1995).

KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1,

109 Sadly, lack of trust is too often characteristic of the relationship between lawyers and their clients. See Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client,
69 GEO. L.J. 1015 (1981).
110 See Williams, supra note 73, at 62; Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasionand Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmakingand the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515,
527.
111 See Pellegrino, supra note 105, at 73.
112 As Sissila Bok has observed, "[I]t is far harder to regain trust, once lost, than to
squander it in the first place." Bok, supra note 108, at 11.
113 Several commentators have urged client counseling of non-legal interests. See,
e.g., BINDER & PRICE, supra note 64; Margulies, supra note 87 and sources cited

therein; Pepper, supra note 98, at 1602-04. See also MODEL RULs, supranote 60, Rule
2.1 & cmt.
114 In this respect, integration shares similarities with the contextual reasoning
advocated by some feminist thinkers. See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-PracticeSpiral:
The Ethics of Feminism and ClinicalEducation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1636-42 (1991).
115 See, e.g., Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness:
Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663, 1671-87 (1989).

116

See BINDER

& PRICE,

supra note 64, at 22.
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grate these emotions into their understanding of the facts. Lawyers
must also provide clients with a full understanding of the consequences of various courses of actions. 117 Thus, a client who wished to
offer an apology as part of a mediated settlement would first be informed about the legal consequences of an apology. 118 Or, a client
who was adamant about commencing litigation would need to be informed about the emotional and financial consequences of litigation.
4.

Exchange and Debate

The heart of the deliberative process is the exchange of ideas and
debate between attorney and client about ends and means, goals and
strategies. In this process of co-deliberation, active trust is enhanced
and the autonomy of both lawyer and client is honored. The idea of
debate is important, for it distinguishes deliberative from non-deliberative counseling.
Deliberation occurs only in cases of doubt or difference of opinion. Thus, during the exchange and debate, the client's goals may
change. 1 19 The counseling image in the exchange and debate phase
is that of the lawyer as educator guiding her client through the decisionmaking process. It is the image recalled by Glendon of the wise
20
counselor who helps her client "explore all angles of a problem"'
and "develop new insights, ideas and perspectives."' 21 The lawyer engages the client in prudential conversation focused on specific interests and achievable goals. The point is to arrive at solutions which are
responsive to individual needs.
a.

The Lawyer's Opinion

People come to lawyers because they need, or think they need,
legal advice or access to the legal system which is not otherwise available to them acting on their own. Implicit in this arrangement is the
idea that a lawyer will navigate and advocate; in short, protect them.
Thus, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to offer her opinion in
117 For an example of this approach in an administrative law context, see Jamie
Heller's argument for "full-picture counseling": Jamie G. Heller, Legal Counseling in
the Administrative State: How to Let the Client Decide, 103 YALE L.J. 2503 (1994).
118 See Peter H. Rehm & Denise R. Beatty, Legal Consequences of Apologizing, 1996J.
Disp. REsOL. 115. For a discussion of possible conditions for the effectiveness of apology in mediation, see Deborah L. Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1165 (1997).
119 See Pepper, supra note 98, at 1601.
120 GLENDON, supra note 2, at 36.
121 Id. at 36.
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mediation counseling. 122 This is not done to "impose" a decision or
to substitute the lawyer's judgment for that of the client's. Rather, it is
done to enhance the client's knowledge and to give her a better understanding of the range of available options. Certainly clients may
disagree with their lawyers, but the lawyers' ability to focus on the specific issues involved enables them to disagree constructively with their
123
clients.
The success of mediation counseling depends upon the lawyer's
ability both to help clients achieve self-governance and to protect clients from themselves. The exercise of self-determination is of questionable value if clients choose harmful results. Thus, in the give-andtake of deliberation, lawyers must guide clients to proper choices
within the realm of self-determination.
b.

Information for Discussion

The dialogue between lawyers and clients must take into account
practical, ethical, and moral considerations. At a practical level, the
decision about what information should be discussed is contextual.
Much depends upon whether the client decides to participate in mediation. My purpose here is not to analyze the factors which should
be considered in deciding for or against mediation.124 Rather, I offer
a deliberative process model to guide client counseling on this question. The deliberative model can also guide the client's future interactions in the mediation process with the mediator and the other
125
disputing party.
If a client decides voluntarily 26 that mediation is the appropriate
course of action, then a number of practical decisions must be ex27
amined, including:
122 In mediation counseling, a lawyer's opinion may make a difference in whether
parties use the mediation process. See, e.g., Pearson et al., The Decision to Mediate:
Profiles of Individuals Who Accept and Reject the Opportunity to Mediate Contested Child Custody and Visitations Issues, J. DIVORCE Fall/Winter 1982, at 17, 29.
123 See GLENDON, supra note 2, at 102-03.
124 For an excellent discussion of the advantages of mediation over bilateral negotiation between lawyers, or over other forms of alternative dispute resolution, see Roc& McEwEN, supra note 51, §§ 4:04-06.
125 See infra text accompanying note 135.
126 Different considerations may apply when a client is required to mediate. See
supra note 52 and sources cited therein.
127 In the non-mediation counseling context, there is little data on the kinds of
decisions lawyers typically examine with their clients. See BINDER & PRICE, supranote
64, at 268 n.30.
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What mediation model best meets a client's needs? 128
129
Who is the appropriate mediator?
What is the client's role? 30
31
What is the lawyer's role?'

Lawyers and clients must also be sensitive to the ethical and
moral implications of client decisionmaking in mediation. 3 2 The private nature, autonomous rule-making powers, and flexible procedures
of mediation offer potential for abuse. 8 33 Representational lawyering
in mediation is a relatively new practice area and little attention has
34
been devoted to the moral and ethical issues confronting lawyers.'
We need more theoretical and empirical study in this area.
C.

Deliberation in Mediation Counseling Enhances the Mediation
Process

Mediation client-counseling based on deliberation provides structure for client decisionmaking both in the attorney-client relationship
and in the mediation process. The deliberative approach informs behavior which can guide clients' future interactions in the mediation
process.' 3 5 Decisions in the counseling relationship are made by cli128 See supra note 36 and sources cited therein.
129 Lawyers who are repeat players are often in a better position than clients to
select mediators. See Lande, supra note 25, at 847.
130 Depending upon the degree of participation clients choose, lawyers may prepare clients to negotiate for themselves in the mediation session. This may involve
taking on the role of coaching or active consulting. While lawyers cannot predict the
outcome of negotiated mediations for clients, they can prepare clients by teaching
them about the stages of negotiation and strategies. SeeWilliams, supra note 74, at 34.

131

See generally MuRRAY ET AL., supranote 79, at 370-71;

ROGERS

& McwEN, supra

note 51, § 4:08; Cf Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 3, at 556; Susan W. Harrell, Why
Attorneys Attend Mediation Sessions, 12 MEDIATION Q. 369 (1995). But see Lande, supra
note 25.
132 A discussion of the ethical issues confronting lawyers in representational mediation practice is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Feldman, supra note 87.
133 See, e.g., Mori Irvine, Serving Two Masters: The Obligation Under the Rules of Professional Conduct to Report Attorney Misconduct in a ConfidentialMediation, 26 RUTGERs LJ.
155 (1994).
134 On the other hand, there has been some analysis of the ethical issues confronting mediators. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, The Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A Study of EthicalDilemmas and Policy Implications, 1994 J. Disp. Rus. 1; Robert B.
Moberly, EthicalStandardsfor Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida'sMandatory Mediation Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 701 (1994).
135 Mediation client counseling differs from traditional negotiation client counseling where lawyers, not clients, will be the primary participants in the negotiation. In
helping clients to deliberate in pre-mediation counseling sessions, lawyers are really
preparing their clients for future deliberations in mediation.
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ents after reasoned deliberations with their attorneys. 13 6 Decisions
may be informed by attorneys' views, but the views are not "imposed"
on the client. Likewise, in the mediation process, decisionmaking belongs to the disputing parties after deliberations with the mediator
and each other.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As we approach the twenty-first century, lawyers must reaffirm a
commitment to professionalism in which the problem-solving and
peacemaking activities of mediation are valued in the practice of law.
Glendon's critique of the adversary culture is a powerful catalyst for
beginning to think about developing a theory of representational
lawyering in mediation. She helps us understand what it means to
practice law with civility and humanity. Her vision of deliberation is
rooted in a deep respect for the dignity of every human being and
provides a structural framework for us to conceive of a legal practice
in which the human element matters, a good practice, driven by the
values of cooperation, courtesy, and mutual respect. The principles of
civility and professionalism which Glendon extols inspire the transformation which must take place. Lawyers and clients who can truly listen to each other, who can debate civilly with one another, and who
can persuade each other based on reasoned discourse will make all
the difference.

136 I realize that some clients may prefer to waive the right to participate significantly in decisionmaking. Cff Elysa Gordan, Note, Multiculturalismin MedicalDecisionmaking: The Notion of Informed Waiver, 23 FoRDHiA

URB. LJ. 1321 (1996).

